What is existentialism?

One of the difficulties in writing a book about ‘existentialism’ is the word itself. It is an ‘ism’ that gives the misleading impression of a coherent and unified philosophical school. The word was officially coined by the French philosopher Gabriel Marcel in 1943 and quickly adopted by his compatriots Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir. But many of the major twentieth-century figures, such as Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Albert Camus, rejected the label, and nineteenth-century pioneers like Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche had never heard of it. Indeed, the representative figures are anything but unified in their views. There are secular existentialists like Sartre, Nietzsche, and Camus whose philosophies are informed by the ‘death of God,’ but there are also prominent theistic existentialists like Marcel, Paul Tillich, and Martin Buber. There are existentialists who claim that we are radically free and morally responsible for our actions, and others, like Nietzsche, who contend that the idea of free will is a fiction. There are some, like Kierkegaard, Beauvoir, and Sartre who maintain that existentialism is a form of subjectivism, while others, such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, reject this equivocation and posit the centrality of intersubjectivity or being-in-the-world. And there are figures who argue that our relations with others are invariably mired in alienation, self-deception, and conflict, but there are also those who develop notions of mutual dependency, selfless love, and genuine communion with others.

Yet, given these conflicting views, there are clear indications of a new philosophical orientation emerging in modern Europe, centering specifically on the question of what it means to be human. As early as the seventeenth century, French philosopher and mathematician Blaise Pascal introduced the phrase ‘logic of the heart’ (logique du coeur) in an attempt to give an account of the affective mystery of human existence that traditional reason and logic could never access. In one of the first expressions of modern existentialism, Pascal writes:

In the middle of the nineteenth century, Kierkegaard would take Pascal's experience of existential isolation and terror and develop an entire philosophy around it, stressing the importance of the singular and concrete passions of the ‘existing individual’ over any abstract or objective truth. A generation later, Nietzsche was promoting the ideals of ‘life philosophy’ (Lebensphilosophie) that emphasized the incalculability of human experience and the inchoate forces of life that could never be explained by appeals to reason. In the 1920s, Heidegger was introducing his own ‘existential analytic’ or ‘analytic of Dasein,’ and his contemporary Karl Jaspers was developing a ‘philosophy of existence’ (Existenzphilosophie), both of which engaged the inexpressible freedom of the individual and the human conditions of anxiety and death that defy rational apprehension. Thus, long before the word ‘existentialism’ was officially introduced in 1943 and the uniform of black sweaters, black pants, and cigarettes populated the cafés of the boulevard St. Germain in Paris, the core ideas of the movement had already been articulated. This helps to explain David Cooper's remark that “none of the great existentialist tomes contain the word ‘existentialism’ ” (1999, 1).

Although it cannot be reduced to a unified school of thought, and the major figures vary widely in their views, the common thread that ties these thinkers together is their concern for the human situation as it is lived. This is a situation that cannot be reasoned about or captured in an abstract system; it can only be felt and made meaningful by the concrete choices and actions of the existing individual. From this shared concern, there are a number of overlapping themes that emerge in the writings that make it possible for us to group them together under a common heading.

Existence precedes Essence: Existentialists forward the idea that humans exist in a way that is different from other things – such as trees, cultural artifacts, and animals. We cannot be understood as mere things that are objectively present because we exist, that is, we make choices and take action throughout our lives. This means there is no pre-given ‘essence’ that determines who and what we are. We are self-making beings that become who we are on the basis of the choices and actions we make as our lives unfold. On this view, there is no definitive or complete account of being human because there is nothing that grounds or secures our existence; we are a ‘not yet,’ always in the process of realizing who we are as we press forward into future projects and possibilities.

The Self as a Tension: By interpreting existence as a process of self-making rather than as an object or thing, existentialists suggest that the structure of the self involves a tension or struggle between what can be called ‘facticity’ and ‘transcendence.’ On the one hand, we are determined by our facticity, where this is understood as the limitations of our factual nature such as our physiology, sexuality, and sociohistorical situation. On the other hand, insofar as we are self-conscious and aware of our limitations, we can transcend or surpass them by taking a stand on them, that is, by choosing to interpret them in certain ways, giving them meaning, and, thus, creating our own identities.

The Anguish of Freedom: As beings that can take a stand on our facticity, existentialists generally agree that we are free and responsible for who we are and what we do. But this realization is often accompanied by anguish because it reminds us that we alone are responsible for the choices and actions we make in our lives. Existentialists reject the idea that there are moral absolutes, utilitarian calculations, or natural laws that can explain or justify our actions. As Sartre writes, when it comes to human actions, “there are no excuses behind us nor justifications before us” (2001, 296).

The Insider's Perspective: Because human existence is not a thing that can be studied from a perspective of detached objectivity, existentialists hold the view that we can understand ourselves only by taking what might be called an ‘insider's perspective.’ That is, prior to any disinterested theorizing about who or what we are, we must first come to grips with the experience of being human as it is lived within the context of our own situation. For this reason, existentialists reject the idea that there can be objectivity when it comes to giving an account of human existence. Any account of what it means to be human is already mediated by the contextual interweaving of our social involvements, bodily orientation, emotions, and perceptual capacities.

Moods as Disclosive: For the existentialists, we do not gain knowledge of the human situation through detached thought or rational demonstration but through the affective experiences of the individual. We understand what counts or matters in our lives through our moods, through the ways in which we feel about things. Some moods, such as ‘anxiety’ (Heidegger), ‘nausea’ (Sartre), ‘guilt’ (Kierkegaard), and ‘absurdity’ (Camus), are especially important for the existentialists because they have the capacity to shake us out of our everyday complacency and self-deception by disclosing the fundamental freedom and finitude of our situation. This, in turn, allows us the opportunity to be honest with ourselves and own up to our lives with renewed passion, intensity, and focus.

The Possibility for Authenticity: Because we have a tendency to conform to the leveled-down roles and identities of the public world, the question of authenticity, of being true to oneself, is central to the existentialists. The idea is formulated in many different ways, in terms of being a ‘knight of faith’ (Kierkegaard), for example, an ‘overman’ (Nietzsche), a ‘rebel’ (Camus), or an ‘authentic individual’ (Heidegger). In this way, existentialists develop the possibility of living a meaningful, committed, and fulfilling life in the face of absurdity and death. The idea of authenticity serves as a powerful rejoinder to the criticism of existentialism as representing a kind of nihilistic, ‘anything goes’ philosophy.

Ethics and Responsibility: Existentialism does not require adherence to any normative moral principle. Yet the argument that existentialism is an amoral philosophy is undeserved. Existentialism centers around the most fundamental of moral questions: ‘What should I do?’ and ‘How should I live?’ Moreover, in acknowledging our fundamental freedom, existentialists recognize that we are not free from taking responsibility for our actions or from cultivating the ideal of freedom for others. To this end, existentialism offers a clear vision of what a valuable or praiseworthy way of life is. It is a life that faces up to the inescapable freedom and vulnerability of the human situation, and takes responsibility for the fact that our actions have consequences and impact the lives of others.

Why this book?

The justification for a new introduction to existentialism is difficult given the number of high-quality monographs published on the topic over the last six decades. Beginning with William Barrett's path-breaking Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy in 1958, a number of early secondary works in English stand out, notably Calvin O. Schrag's Existence and Freedom (1961), Robert Olson's An Introduction to Existentialism (1962), John Macquarrie's Existentialism (1972), and Robert Solomon's From Rationalism to Existentialism: The Existentialists and Their Nineteenth-Century Backgrounds (1972). Despite their significant contribution, these texts are now quite outdated. More recently, Thomas Flynn has written a crisp and engaging little book called Existentialism: A Very Short Introduction (2006), but, because of its brevity, it is unable to engage a wide range of thinkers or develop key issues in sufficient detail. Without question, it is David Cooper's Existentialism: A Reconstruction (1990; 2nd ed., 1999) that has set the standard in terms of comprehensiveness and bringing existentialism up to date and into conversation with core themes in mainstream Anglophone philosophy. My aim in this book is to follow Cooper's lead in emphasizing existentialism's enduring relevance to contemporary philosophy, but I try to draw on a wider range of philosophical and literary figures and address themes that are often neglected or underdeveloped in other introductory works.

There is a tendency in the secondary texts to focus narrowly on the ‘big four,’ Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre. This approach is understandable given the enormous philosophical and cultural impact of these figures, but it tends to overlook the significance of religious and literary existentialists such as Dostoevsky, Camus, Tolstoy, Marcel, Unamuno, and Buber, as well as feminist figures such as Beauvoir. In some introductions, the influence of Nietzsche's philosophy is minimized because he rejects one of the central tenets of existentialism, namely that human beings are radically free and, therefore, morally responsible for their actions. There are also crucial themes of embodiment and being-in-the-world that are often undeveloped, and there is sometimes a failure to situate existentialism within the historical context of modernity. Finally, there is the issue of the significant influence that existentialism has had in the applied fields of medicine, psychiatry, and psychotherapy, an impact that is often glossed over in introductory texts.

This book attempts to address these shortcomings. Although much attention is paid to the ‘big four,’ I try to cast a much larger net, drawing on a wide range of philosophical and literary figures as they become relevant to the issues. The first chapter, ‘Existentialism and Modernity,’ is devoted to the historical roots of the Western self as it emerges from the tension between Greek reason and Hebraic faith and how this tension is recast in modernity. To this end, Nietzsche's work is placed center-stage in framing the situation of nihilism and ‘the death of God’ that becomes crucial to twentieth-century existentialists. There is also a brief discussion of the broader cultural impact of existentialism outside of philosophy.

, ‘The Insider's Perspective,’ engages existentialism's critique of methodological detachment and objectivity by arguing that any account of human existence must begin from inside one's own finite and situated perspective. Here, different accounts of the insider's perspective are introduced, including Kierkegaard's conception of ‘subjective truth,’ Nietzsche's ‘perspectivism,’ and phenomenological accounts as they emerge in the work of Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty.

, ‘Being-in-the-World,’ addresses the ways in which existentialism undermines traditional philosophical dualisms by interpreting the human being not as an encapsulated thing or substance, but in terms of pre-reflective involvement in the world. Although the chapter draws largely on the seminal work of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty to articulate how we already embody an understanding of intra-worldly things, it also engages the work of figures like Frantz Fanon and Iris Marion Young to show how this tacit understanding can break down on the basis of racial and sexual difference.

The remainder of the book deals with the key issues of selfhood, freedom, authenticity, and ethics. , ‘Self and Others,’ describes the existentialist configuration of the self as a struggle between ‘facticity’ and ‘transcendence.’ With wide-ranging references to Sartre, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Tolstoy, and Ortega y Gasset, as well as to contemporary Anglophone philosophers such as Harry Frankfurt and Charles Taylor, the chapter illustrates how human beings are always making or creating themselves by interpreting and giving meaning to their factical situation. This chapter also addresses issues of embodiment and how the process of self-creation is often compromised by our calcified tendency to conform to the identities and roles of the public world.

introduces freedom as the central idea of existentialism and identifies the ways in which existential freedom is distinct from more conventional views. Using Dostoevsky's Notes from the Underground to frame the idea, the chapter discusses ‘radical’ or ‘absolute’ forms of freedom promoted by Sartre as well as the ‘situated’ forms of freedom developed by Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Beauvoir. The chapter concludes with a discussion of Nietzsche's views on freedom. Although he breaks with other existentialists by criticizing the idea of free will and moral responsibility, Nietzsche can be viewed as offering his own version of situated freedom, one that is rooted in the polymorphous drives of the body but also reflects the goal of self-creation that is crucial to the existentialist program.

, ‘Authenticity,’ builds on the discussion of freedom by exploring what it means to be true to oneself. Here the significance of penetrating emotional experiences like anxiety, absurdity, and guilt is developed as having the power to pull us out of self-deception and bring us face-to-face with our own freedom and death. This discussion also explores how the existentialist account of emotions breaks decisively with the Romantic tradition. The second half of the chapter is framed around the core tension between being ethical (‘doing what is right’) and being authentic (‘being true to oneself’) and focuses on the influential accounts of authenticity offered by Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre.

, ‘Ethics,’ challenges the criticism that existentialism promotes a brand of ‘anything goes’ philosophy. The chapter begins by showing how existentialists like Sartre and Beauvoir support a notion of moral responsibility and of cultivating the value of freedom for others. The discussion then shifts to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, who argue that there are moral demands that are already placed on us through our involvement in a shared historical situation (Heidegger) and through our intercorporeality (Merleau-Ponty). The chapter concludes by showing how religious existentialists like Buber and Levinas challenge the modern attitudes of selfishness and individualism and develop a moral orientation rooted in the affective recognition of human vulnerability and suffering.

engages existentialism's enormous contribution to psychiatry and psychotherapy. Drawing on the work of existential therapists such as R. D. Laing, Irvin Yalom, and Rollo May, the chapter explores the value of existentialism in psychiatry by showing how the patient's experience of psychopathology always needs to be situated and contextualized. On this view, the therapist does not regard the patient as an object of scientific investigation and does not necessarily interpret psychic suffering as a medical disease but as an existential given that has the power to disclose who we are as human beings. When anxiety overwhelms us by bringing us face-to-face with our own freedom and death, the therapist does not simply want to manage or control this feeling with medication or psychiatric techniques. The aim, rather, is to accept and integrate the unsettling experience into our lives. This acceptance can, in turn, free us from everyday forms of self-deception and open us up to deeper and more meaningful ways of living.

The final chapter, ‘Existentialism Today,’ addresses key aspects of existentialism that continue to shape the current intellectual landscape. The chapter begins with a discussion of existentialism's impact on recent political philosophy, focusing primarily on how it conceives of the experience of oppression and how this conception has profoundly influenced developments in feminist and post­colonial theory and critical philosophies of race. It then moves to existentialism's role in environmental philosophy. Drawing largely on the work of Heidegger, the discussion centers on the dangers of dualistic thinking when it comes to how we interpret nature and shows how the existentialist understanding of the self as being-in-the-world has helped environmental philosophers reconfigure our relationship to technology and to the earth itself. This discussion leads to an account of existentialism's impact on the emergence and legitimation of comparative philosophy in the West by illuminating affinities between Buddhist conceptions of ‘suffering’ (dukkha) and those found in the existentialist tradition. The discussion goes on to show how Buddhism addresses some potential shortcomings in existentialism by not romanticizing suffering but by offering specific practices to end it. The chapter concludes with an assessment of existentialism's legacy in contemporary medicine and its focus on the lived experience of illness rather the objective nature of disease. In questioning the viability of the scientific standpoint of detachment and objectivity, existentialism calls for healthcare professionals to not just ‘fix’ the diseased body but to help the patients give meaning to and make sense of their own experiences.

This brief summary provides an indication of the purpose of this book. It is not only meant to offer an accessible and scholarly introduction to the central themes of existentialism. With references to a broad range of thinkers and drawing on the work of leading Anglophone commentators, it is meant to show that existentialism is by no means a moribund or outdated mode of thinking. The ideas remain fresh and vital because they speak to the most pressing concerns that we face in the secular age: ‘Who am I?’ and ‘How should I live?’ In the following chapters, we will engage the core ideas of existentialism, all the while keeping in view the difficulty in demarcating the boundaries of the movement. It is important to remind the reader that, among the myriad thinkers traditionally included under the label ‘existentialist,’ only Sartre and Beauvoir explicitly identified themselves as such. The term, in the way I am using it, refers to a diverse group of philosophers and literary figures who were concerned about the question of what it means to be human. And although the range of thinkers can be traced back to the classical works of Epicurus and the Stoic philosophies of Seneca and Epictetus, and core ideas can be found germinating in the writings of Augustine, Shakespeare, Michel de Montaigne, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Pascal, my focus will be on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and those figures that followed Kierkegaard.

In order to cast the net as widely as possible and to bring literary and religious figures into the discussion, I reject David Cooper's notion that existentialism refers to a “relatively systematic philosophy” (1999, 8) and agree with commentators like Jeff Malpas (2012) who suggest that such a view invariably excludes seminal literary figures like Camus, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, and Kafka, and perhaps even Kierkegaard and Nietzsche themselves, whose indirect and aphoristic styles were anything but systematic. Indeed, I want to argue that these literary approaches are one of the major reasons why existentialism became the cultural phenomenon that it did. With little or no training in academic philosophy, readers were provided with vivid and accessible points of entry into the ultimate questions of ‘absurdity,’ ‘freedom,’ and ‘death.’ By broadening the term in this way, I can draw on a more comprehensive range of figures as they become relevant to particular topics, regardless of whether or not they were philosophers or literary figures and whether or not they were inclined to self-identify as ‘existentialists.’ For the purposes of this project, if the work engages the struggle of the human condition, the anguish at the loss of moral absolutes, and the vertiginous freedom of self-creation, it can be called existentialism.