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1. J. Stalin Problems of Leninism (Moscow, 1947), pp. 460–61.

2. W. Treue ‘Hitlers Denkschrift zum Vierjahresplan 1936’, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 3 (1955), pp. 204–5.

3. Treue, ‘Hitlers Denkschrift’, p. 205.

4. A. Hitler The Secret Book ed. T. Taylor (New York, 1961), p. 25.

5. Imperial War Museum, FO 645 Box 162, testimony of Fritz Wiedemann at Nuremberg, 9 October 1945, p. 23.

6. V. I. Lenin Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (Peking, 1965), p. 6: preface to the French and German editions.

7. J. Stalin Works (13 vols, Moscow, 1952–55), vol. xii, p. 182, letter to A. M. Gorky, 17 January 1930.

8. M. von Boetticher Industrialisierungspolitik und Verteidigungskonzeption der UdSSR 1926–1930 (Düsseldorf, 1979), pp. 164–6; J. Erickson The Soviet High Command: a Military-Political History 1918–1941 (London, 1962), p. 284.

9. Boetticher, Industrialisierungspolitik, p. 166.

10. M. von Hagen Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship: the Red Army and the Soviet Socialist State, 1917–1930 (Ithaca, NY, 1990), pp. 204–5.

11. von Hagen, Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship, p. 203.

12. R. Pennington ‘From Chaos to the Eve of the Great Patriotic War, 1922–41’, in R. Higham, J. T. Greenwood and V. Hardesty (eds) Russian Aviation and Airpower in the Twentieth Century (London, 1998), p. 39; see too W. S. Dunn Hitlers Nemesis: the Red Army, 1930–1945 (Westport, Conn., 1994), p. 27.

13. J. W. Kipp ‘Mass, Mobility, and the Origins of Soviet Operational Art, 1918–1936’, in C. W. Reddel (ed.) Transformations in Russian and Soviet Military History (Washington, DC, 1990), p. 95.

14. H. Shukman (ed.) Stalin’s Generals (London, 1993), pp. 220–23; P. A. Bayer The Evolution of the Soviet General Staff 1917–1941 (New York, 1987), pp. 152 ff.

15. I. S. Bloch Modern Weapons and Modern War: Is War Now Impossible? (London, 1900).

16. A. J. Echevarria After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers before the Great War (Lawrence, Kans., 2000), pp. 85–7, 201–4.

17. E. Ludendorff The Nation at War (London, 1935), pp. 22–3.

18. D. Fensch and O. Groehler, ‘Imperialistische Ökonomie und militärische Strategie: eine Denkschrift Wilhelm Groeners’, Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, 19 (1971), pp. 1170–77, ‘Bedeutung der modernen Wirtschaft für die Strategie’, c. 1927/8.

19. Boetticher, Industrialisierungspolitik, p. 209.

20. Bayer, Evolution of Soviet General Staff, pp. 152–3; Erickson, Soviet High Command, pp. 293–4.

21. L. Samuelson Plans for Stalin’s War Machine: Tukhachevskii and Military-Economic Planning, 1925–1941 (London, 2000), pp. 11–15, 17–18, 37–8; Boetticher, Industrialisierungspolitik, p. 207.

22. Samuelson, Plans for Stalin’s War Machine, pp. 22–3.

23. Y. Dyakov and T. Bushuyeva (eds) The Red Army and the Wehrmacht: How the Soviets Militarized Germany, 1922–1933 (New York, 1995) pp. 18–26; on the ‘Statistical Society’ see B. A. Carroll Design for Total War: Arms and Economics in the Third Reich (The Hague, 1968), pp. 54–7, 64–71. See too E. W. Hansen Reichswehr und Industrie: Rüstungswirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und wirtschaftliche Mobilmachungsvorbereitungen, 1923–1932 (Boppard am Rhein, 1978).

24. Hitler, Secret Book, pp. 5, 15.

25. Treue, ‘Hitlers Denkschrift’, p. 206.

26. Stalin, Problems of Leninism, pp. 520–21, ‘Address to graduates from Red Army Academies’, 4 May 1935.

27. Stalin, Problems of Leninism, p. 405, The Results of the First Five-Year Plan’, report to the CC Plenum, 7 January 1933.

28. L. Samuelson ‘Mikhail Tukhachevsky and War-Economic Planning: Reconsiderations on the Pre-War Soviet Military Build-Up’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 9 (1996), p. 828.

29. R. W. Davies and M. Harrison ‘Defence spending and defence industry in the 1930s’, in J. Barber and M. Harrison (eds) The Soviet De fence-Industry Complex from Stalin to Khrushchev (London, 2000), p. 73; R. W. Davies ‘Soviet Military Expenditure and the Armaments Industry 1929–1933: A Reconsideration’, Europe – Asia Studies, 45 (1993), pp. 577–86.

30. Samuelson, Plans for Stalin’s War Machine, pp. 128–43; T. Martin ‘The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing’, Journal of Modern History, 70 (1998), pp. 837–47.

31. D. Stone Hammer and Rifl e: the Militarization of the Soviet Union 1926–1933 (Lawrence, Kans., 2000), pp. 185–6: Stalin told Voroshilov after the Manchurian invasion that ‘things with Japan are complicated, serious’.

32. Treue, ‘Hitlers Denkschrift’, p. 204; Stalin, Problems of Leninism, p. 461, Report to the Seventeenth Congress of the CPSU, 26 January 1924.

33. B.-J. Wendt Grossdeutschland: Aussenpolitik und Kriegsvorbereitung des Hitler-Regimes (Munich, 1987).

34. R. J. Overy ‘From “Uralbomber” to “Amerikabomber”: the Luftwaffe and Strategic Bombing’, Journal of Strategic Studies, I (1978), pp. 155–6.

35. W. S. Dunn The Soviet Economy and the Red Army 1930–1945 (London, 1995), p. 2–1; see too R. L. Schweller Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest (New York, 1998), pp. 206–7. Schweller calculates a ‘power weight’ in 1938/9, based on resources and military spending, of 100 for Germany, 72.5 for the USSR, 29.0 for Britain, 20.2 for the USA and 15.3 for France.

36. Davies, ‘Soviet Military Expenditure’, pp. 590–91, 601; G. Kennedy The Economics of Defence (London, 1975), p. 79; S. Andic and J. Veverka ‘The Growth of Government Expenditure in Germany’, Finanzarchiv, 25 (1964), p. 261. The fi gure in 1913 was 3.6 per cent.

37. Dunn, Hitler’s Nemesis, pp. 26–32; W. Deist ‘Die Aufrüstung der Wehrmacht’, in W. Deist et al. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg (Stuttgart, 1979), p. 447. The fi gure by September 1939 was 2.87 million men.

38. M. Harrison Soviet Planning in Peace and War, 1938–1945 (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 250–53; Samuelson, ‘Mikhail Tukhachevsky’, pp. 805–9; R. Wagenführ Die deutsche Industrie im Kriege (Berlin, 1963), p. 74.

39. Overy, ‘From “Uralbomber” to “Amerikabomber” ‘, pp. 155–7; A. Bagel-Bohlan Hitlers industrielle Kriegsvorbereitung im Dritten Reich 1936 bis 1939 (Koblenz, 1975), pp. 117–21.

40. J. Rohwer and M. Monakov Stalin’s Ocean-Going Fleet: Soviet Naval Strategy and Shipbuilding Programme 1935–1953 (London, 2001), pp. 54–62, 103, 229–56.

41. J. Dülffer Weimar, Hitler und die Marine: Reichspolitik und Flottenbau 1920–1939 (Düsseldorf, 1973), pp. 488–504; W. Deist The Wehrmacht and German Rearmament (London, 1981), pp. 82–4.

42. T. M. Nichols The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Confl ict over Soviet National Security, 1917–1992 (Ithaca, NY, 1993), p. 50; A. van Ishoven Messerschmitt (London, 1975), pp. 115, 172.

43. IWM, FD 3056/49 ‘Statistical Material on the German Manpower Position’, 31, July 1945, Table 7, based on returns from Reichsgruppe Industrie to the statistical offi ce.

44. J. Gillingham ‘The “Deproletarianization” of German Society: Vocational Training in the Third Reich’, Journal of Social History, 19 (1985/6), pp. 427–8.

45. Samuelson, Plans for Stalin’s War Machine, pp. 191–5; N. S. Simonov ‘Mobpodgotovka: mobilisation planning in interwar industry’, in Barber and Harrison, Soviet Defence-Industry Complex, pp. 216–17.

46. J. Heyl ‘The Construction of the Westwall: an Example of National-Socialist Policy-making’, Central European History, 14 (1981), p. 72; R. E. Tarleton ‘What Really Happened to the Stalin Line?’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 6 (1993), pp. 21–61.

47. R. Absolon Die Wehrmacht im Dritten Reich: Band IV, 5 Februar 1938 bis 31 August 1939 (Boppard am Rhein, 1979),

pp. 9–11; see too IWM, EDS Mi 14/478 Heereswaffenamt ‘Die personelle Leistungsfähigkeit Deutschlands im Mob.-Fall’, March 1939.

48. Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik, Ser D, vol. vi (Baden-Baden, 1956), p. 481.

49. Dunn, Hitler’s Nemesis, pp. 27, 29, 57; Simonov, ‘mobilisation planning’, pp. 211–215; D. M. Glantz Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War (Lawrence, Kans., 1998), pp. 100–101.

50. On Soviet manpower mobilization G. F. Krivosheev (ed.) Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century (London, 1997), p. 91; B. V. Sokolov ‘The Cost of War: Human Losses for the USSR and Germany, 1939–45’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 9 (1996), p. 165.

51. H. Rauschning Germany’s Revolution of Destruction (London, 1938), p. 133.

52. Stone, Hammer and Rifl e, pp. 3–5; I. Getzler ‘Lenin’s Conception of Revolution as Civil War’, in I. D. Thatcher (ed.) Regime and Society in Twentieth-Century Russia (London, 1999), pp. 109–17.

53. The Military Writings and Speeches of Leon Trotsky (6 vols, London, 1981), vol. iii, pp. 56, 374–5; vol. v, pp. 24–5.

54. Stalin, Works, vol. xii, p. 189, ‘Concerning the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class’, 21 January 1930.

55. L. Viola The Best Sons of the Fatherland: Workers in the Vanguard of Soviet Collectivization (New York, 1987), p. 62.

56. Viola, Best Sons of the Fatherland, p. 64.

57. R. Hanser Prelude to Terror: The Rise of Hitler 1919–1923 (London, 1970), pp. 266–71; in general see D. Schumann Politisches Gewalt in der Weimarer Republik 1919–1933 (Essen, 2001); B. Ziemann ‘Germany after the First World War – a Violent Society?’ Journal of Modern European History, 1 (2003), pp. 80–95.

58. R. Taylor Literature and Society in Germany 1918–1945 (Brighton, 1980), p. 119.

59. V. Berghahn Der Stahlhelm: Bund der Frontsoldaten 1918–1935 (Düsseldorf, 1966), pp. 275–7, 286; P. Longerich Die braunen Bataillone: Geschichte der SA (Munich, 1989), pp. 159, 184. On the ambiguity of this identifi cation with war see S. Kienitz ‘Der Krieg der Invaliden. Helden-Bilder und Männlichkeitskonstruktion nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg’, Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift, 60 (2001), pp. 367–402.

60. W. Wette ‘From Kellogg to Hitler (1928–1933). German Public Opinion Concerning the Rejection and Glorifi cation of War’, in W. Deist (ed.) The German Military in the Age of Total War (Oxford, 1985), p. 83.

61. T. Nevin Ernst Jünger and Germany: Into the Abyss 1914–1945 (London, 1997), p. 108; Wette, ‘From Kellogg to Hitler’, p. 85. See too G. Mosse Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars (Oxford, 1990), pp. 159–80; K. Theweleit Male Fantasies: Volume II. Male Bodies: psychoanalysing the white terror (Oxford, 1989), pp. 143–76.

62. Wette, ‘From Kellogg to Hitler’, pp. 88–9.

63. W. H. Chamberlin Russia’s Iron Age (London, 1934), p. 193–4.

64. J. W. Baird To Die for Germany: Heroes in the Nazi Pantheon (Bloom-ington, Ind., 1990), pp. 101–3.

65. Baird, To Die for Germany, p. 106.

66. F. J. Stephens Hitler Youth: History, Organisation, Uniforms, Insignia (London, 1973), pp. 5–7, 10–14, 37, 44–5; C. Schubert-Weller Hitler-Jugend: Vom ‘Jungsturm Adolf Hitler’ zur Staatsjugend des Dritten Reiches (Weinheim, 1993), pp. 165–88; L. Pine ‘Creating Conformity: the Training of Girls in the Bund Deutscher MädeV, European History Quarterly’, 33 (2003), pp. 371–5, 377–80.

67. W. Benz ‘Vom freiwilligen Arbeitsdienst zur Arbeitsdienstpfl icht’, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 16 (1968), pp. 317–46.

68. Bank of England, German fi les E8/56 204/8 C. A. Gunston ‘The German Labour Service’, The Old Lady, 10 (December, 1934), pp. 277–87.

69. A. E. Gorsuch ‘“NEP Be Damned”: Young Militants in the 1920s and the Culture of Civil War’, Russian Review, 56 (1997), pp. 566–8, 576.

70. Chamberlin, Russia’s Iron Age, pp. 200–202; Erickson, Soviet High Command, pp. 307–8.

71. J. W. Young Totalitarian Language: OrwelVs Newspeak and its Nazi and Communist Antecedents (Charlottesville, Va., 1991), p. 92.

72. Stephens, Hitler Youth, p. 5; on the idealization of the warrior see P. Reichel ‘Festival and Cult: Masculine and Militaristic

Mechanisms of National Socialism’, in J. A. Mangan (ed.) Shaping the Superman: Fascist Body as Political Icon – Aryan Fascism (London, 1999), pp. 153–67.

73. Getzler, ‘Lenin’s Conception of Revolution’, p. 109.

74. Military Writings of Leon Trotsky, vol. iii, p. 374.

75. Chamberlin, Russia’s Iron Age, p. 299.

76. M. Kipp ‘Militarisierung der Lehrlingsausbildung in der “Ordensburg der Arbeit”’, in U. Hermann and U. Nassen (eds) Formative Ästhetik im Nationalsozialismus (Weinheim, 1994), pp. 2.09, 216–17. See too O. Bartov ‘The Missing Years: German Workers, German Soldiers’, in D. Crew (ed.) Nazism and German Society, 1933–1945 (London, 1994), pp. 54–60; W. Wette ‘Ideologien, Propaganda und Innenpolitik als Voraussetzung der Kriegspolitik des Dritten Reiches’, in Deist et ai, Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, pp. 152–4, 166–73.

77. L. Peiffer ‘“Soldatische Haltung in Auftreten und Sprache ist beim Turnunterricht selbstverständlich” – Die Militarisierung und

Disziplinierung des Schulsports’, in Hermann and Nassen, Formative Ästhetik in Nationalsozialismus, pp. 181–3.

78. Military Writings of Leon Trotsky, vol. v, p. 24.

79. S. Fitzpatrick Everyday Stalinism. Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s (Oxford, 1999), p. 17.

80. K.-J. Müller Das Heer und Hitler. Armee und nationalsozialistisches Regime 1933–1940 (Stuttgart, 1969), p. 63.

81. P. Hayes ‘Kurt von Schleicher and Weimar Polities’, Journal of Modern History, 52 (1980), pp. 37–40 for Schleicher’s view of politics.

82. Erickson, Soviet High Command, pp. 316–17.

83. von Hagen, Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship, pp. 206–9; Military Writings of Leon Trotsky, vol. v, p. 23.

84. Erickson, Soviet High Command, p. 309; von Hagen, Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship, pp. 94–100, ch. 5 passim.

85. Bayer, Evolution of the Soviet General Staff, p. 162.

86. Samuelson, Plans for Stalin’s War Machine, pp. 108–9

87. E. O’Ballance The Red Army (London, 1964), pp. 116–18.

88. V. Rapaport and Y. Alexeev High Treason: Essays on the History of the Red Army, 1918–1938 (Durham, NC, 1985), p. 12.

89. H. J. Rautenberg ‘Drei dokumente zur Planung eines 300,000-Mann Friedenheeres aus dem Dezember 1933’, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 22 (1977), pp. 103–39; M. Geyer ‘Das Zweite Rüstungsprogramm (1930–1934)’, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 17 (1975), pp. 25–72; W. Bernhardt Die deutsche Aufrüstung 1934–1939 (Frankfurt am Main, 1969), pp. 72–4, 84.

90. Carroll, Design for Total War, pp. 91–2, 108–9, 12.

91. R. J. O’Neill The German Army and the Nazi Party, 1933–1939 (London, 1966), p. 87.

92. O’Neill, German Army, p. 90.

93. E. R. Hooton Phoenix Triumphant: the Rise and Rise of the Luftwaffe (London, 1994), pp. 94–9, 110–11; E. Homze Arming the Luftwaffe: the Reich Air Ministry and the German Aircraft Industry, 1919–39 (Lincoln, Nebr., 1976), pp. 51–60, 98–103; A. van Ishoven The Fall of an Eagle: the Life of Fighter Ace Ernst Udet (London, 1977), pp. 152–3, 161–2.

94. Bundesarchiv-Berlin, R2/21776–81, Reich fi nance ministry ‘Entwicklung der Ausgaben in der Rechnungsjahren 1934–1939’, 17 July 1939.

95. O’Neill, German Army, p. 115; A. W. Zoepf Wehrmacht zwischen Tradition und Ideologie: Der NS-Führungsoffi zier im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Frankfurt am Main, 1988), pp. 24–9.

96. O’Neill, German Army, pp. 119–20.

97. See on tensions between old and new elements M. Geyer Traditional Elites and National Socialist Leadership’, in C. Maier (ed.) The Rise of the Nazi Regime: New Perspectives (London, 1986), pp. 57–68; Deist et ai, Deutsches Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, pp. 500–17.

98. On army/SS relations O’Neill, German Army, pp. 143–52.

99. B. Wegner Hitlers politische Soldaten: die Waffen-SS 1933–1945 (Paderborn, 1992.), pp. 104–14.

100. Samuelson, Plans for Stalin’s War Machine, pp. 113–15. Offi cers continued to be investigated in the early 1930s, and party membership withdrawn. See F. Schauff ‘Company Choir of Terror: The Military Council of the 1930s – the Red Army Between the XVIIth and XVIIIth Party Congresses’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 12 (1999), pp. 136–7, 141–2.

101. Rapaport and Alexeev, High Treason, pp. 15–19.

102. Samuelson, Plans for Stalin’s War Machine, p. 114; Nichols, Sacred Cause, pp. 42–3.

103. D. Volkogonov Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy (London, 1991), p. 319; C.Andrew and O. Gordievsky KGB: the Inside Story (London, 1990), p. 106.

104. S. Main The Arrest and “Testimony” of Marshal of the Soviet Union M. N. Tukhachevsky (May – June 1937)’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 10 (1997), pp. 152–5.

105. V. Rogovin 1937: Stalin’s Year of Terror (Oak Park, Mich., 1998), pp. 470–82; see too L. Martens Un autre regard sur Staline (Brussels, 1994), pp. 185–90.

106. A. Resis (ed.) Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics (Chicago, 1993), p. 280.

107. A. M. Nekrich Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations 1922–1941 (New York, 1997), pp. 88–9, 99–100.

108. Resis, Molotov Remembers, p. 275; Nekrich, Pariahs, Partners, p. 100; R. C. Nation Black Earth, Red Star: a History of Soviet Security Policy 1917–1991 (Ithaca, NY, 1992.), pp. 90, 96. Rykov also confi rmed a ‘plot’: see N. Leites and E. Bernant Rituals of Liquidation: the Case of the Moscow Trials (Glencoe, Ill., 1954), p. 317.

109. R. Reese Stalin’s Reluctant Soldiers: a Social History of the Red Army, 1925–1941 (Lawrence, Kans., 1996), pp. 134–46; N. M. Yakupov ‘Stalin and the Red Army’, Istoria SSSR, 5 (1991), pp. 170–2.

110. H. Deutsch Hitler and his Generals: the Hidden Crisis, January-June 1938 (Minnesota, 1974), p. 40.

111. H. Trevor-Roper Hitler’s Table Talk, 1941–1944 (London, 1974), p. 633, 16 August 1942.

112. Deutsch, Hitler and his Generals, pp. 80–87, 98–104.

113. Deutsch, Hitler and his Generals, p. 111; F. Hossbach Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler 1934–1938 (Göttingen, 1965), pp. 123–4.

114. Deutsch, Hitler and his Generals, p. 251.

115. G. P. Megargee Zwszde Hitler’s High Command (Lawrence, Kans., 2000), pp. 44–5; Absolon, Wehrmacht im Dritten Reich, pp. 156–7.

116. IWM, FO 645 Box 158, memorandum by Wilhelm Keitel, The position and powers of the Chief of OKW, 9 October 1945, pp. 1–2.

117. Deutsch, Hitler and his Generals, p. 307.

118. Deist, ‘Aufrüstung der Wehrmacht’, p. 512.

119. Absolon, Wehrmacht im Dritten Reich, pp. 161–70

120. K.-J. Müller ‘Über den “Militärischen Widerstand”, in P. Steinbach and J. Tuchel (eds) Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus (Berlin, 1994), pp. 270–75.

121. Zoepf, Wehrmacht zwischen Tradition und Ideologie, pp. 32–8.

122. O’Neill, German Army, p. 103.

123. Wegner, Hitlers politische Soldaten, pp. 114–15.

124. H. Holdenhauer ‘Die Reorganisation der Roten Armee vor der “Grossen Säuberung” bis zum deutschen Angriff auf die UdSSR (1938–1941)’, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 55 (1996), p. 137; Reese, Stalin’s Reluctant Soldiers, p. 144.

125. Rauschning, Germany’s Revolution of Destruction, pp. 166–7.

126. K. E. Voroshilov Stalin and the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R. (Moscow, 1951), p. 53.

127. G. Engel Heeresadjutant bei Hitler 1938–1943: Aufzeichnungen des Majors Engel, ed. H. von Kotze (Stuttgart, 1974), p. 59.